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Abstract 
The outbreak of the recent global financial crisis in 2007-2008 of the most developed economies, has spurred criticism 
that inflation targeting central banks may have neglected the build-up of financial imbalances. In other words the global 
financial and economic crisis highlights that central banks should be more effective in mastering financial instability, 
and should achieve an explicit goal of financial stability beyond their traditional emphasis on low inflation. In this paper, 
we aim to assess whether inflation targeting (IT) actually mattered as regards financial stability. Our empirical evidence 
has been conducted on a group of 41 emerging economies from which 20 economies adopt Inflation Targeting policy 
and 21 non Inflation Targeting economies as a group of control, over the period 2000-2017. To do this, we evaluate the 
time varying treatment effect of the IT's adoption on the banking system stability. Additionally using a variety of 
propensity score matching methods, we show that, on average inflation targeting has an insignificant effect on lowering 
banking system instability. 
Keywords: inflation targeting, financial stability, treatment effect, propensity score matching. emerging economies 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, inflation targeting as a monetary regime has been gaining ground in both developed and emerging 
countries (Mishkin, 2004; Heenan et al. 2006). This monetary regime has been the subject of several studies that 
assessed its economic performance. At this level, evidence has pointed to its ability to maintain prices at lower levels 
(Mishkin, 1999; Johnson, 2002; Bean, 2009). 
However, after the revolutionary financial changes triggered by the recent global financial crisis (2007-2008) and the 
progress in information and telecommunication technology, inflation targeting remains limited in time (Woodford, 
2012).  
Furthermore, the traditional theory of inflation targeting known by the Schwartz hypothesis (1995), assumes that price 
stability generates improvement in the financial system’s performance. However, these assumptions disagree with those 
of other experts who believe that any decrease in price levels generates financial destabilization. 
In other words, adoption of inflation targeting certainly allows for stabilized macroeconomic aggregates, yet this 
stabilization remains at odds with financial stability. More specifically, some economic fundamentals cannot resist 
exogenous chocks despite their robustness, generating thereafter a financial vulnerability that intensifies the impact of 
these chocks on the real economic sphere. Pierre and Luiz (2013). 
In this respect and according to recent studies, central banks’ concern with prices’ stability threatens financial stability. 
Blanchard et al. (2010). This can be explained by the fact that a low and a stable consumer price index does not rapidly 
express any information reflecting financial imbalances, in particular the emergence of phenomena like asset bubbles 
and frictions in bank credit volume. Goodhart (2004).  
In this regard, executing a price stability regime as the unique objective of monetary policy works at the expense of 
financial stability. This latter policy rigidness brought the relationship between price stability and financial stability into 
focus. 
These changes in monetary perspectives brought to light new research trends that dealt with inflation targeting by 
including the economic stability dimension. However, this literature remains scarce and limited. Hence, our study aims 
at covering two dimensions. First, it looks for enriching the scarcity of the literature. Second, it aims at highlighting our 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 7, No. 2; 2020 
86 
 
contribution to the previous literature by including the banking stability dimension. To this end, our study tries to 
determine the impact of inflation targeting on banking stability in a sample of emerging countries, using the treatment 
effect method. 
Our paper then is structures as follows: Section 2 presents an overview on the theoretical relationship between an 
inflation targeting policy and financial stability. Section 3 reviews the earlier studies that empirically examined the 
relationship between these two variables. Section 4 presents our research methodology. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the obtained results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Theoretical Relationship Between Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability 
During the 1990s, the emergence of inflation targeting as a recalibrating monetary policy regime, gained ground not 
only in developed countries but also in emerging ones. According to (Mishkin, 2004, 2011; Heenan et al. 2006) inflation 
targeting consists of five basic components. These are an institutional commitment towards price stability, an 
evolutionary, a developed communication system, and the explicit and public disclosure of time-bound nominal 
inflation targets in the mid-term. Furthermore, an inflation-targeting regime should rely on a high degree of 
responsibility as well as on an inclusive information strategy manifesting itself in taking into account information about 
monetary aggregates and exchange rates. Provision of these, would allow authorities to better set up a monetary policy 
instrument.  
These new perspectives present an opportunity for several researchers to further examine the macroeconomic 
performance of inflation targeting. Among these researchers, Roger (2010) proved that inflation targeting allows for 
controlling and stabilizing prices as well as further rationalizing anticipations allowing inflation targeting countries to 
move to a disinflation period. Indeed, according to Gonçalves and Carvalho (2009), disinflation does not penalize loss 
of output for inflation targeters (ITers). In other words, the weight of this loss is less important for ITers than for 
non-ITers because of a high degree of transparency and communication output practiced by monetary authorities. In 
addition, Brito (2010) questions this result as he considers a loss of output can be generated following a disinflation 
period. 
Despite the ambiguous real effect of low inflation on macroeconomic aggregates, disinflation generates, ceteris paribus, 
a positive effect on financial stability. This assumption has been initially developed by the Schwartz hypothesis (1995) 
presuming that an instable price generates uncertain future real investment returns. Furthermore, the Schwartz 
hypothesis is not a financial crisis theory but rather a hypothesis that explains how price instability may generate 
financial instability and increase the probability of a crisis shock. However, this hypothesis proves that monetary 
stability improves financial stability, while explaining that a maintained inflation rate encourages borrowing and 
speculative investment as an increase in prices will be anticipated. 
With an unstable inflation, default risk increases because of inflation control via an increase in interest rates, which 
reduces depositors’ income. Subsequently, a deterioration in bank spread is highly likely, which may lead to a panic in 
the banking system causing a failure of financial institutions. Several researchers support the Schwartz hypothesis 
(1995), like (Bordo and Wheelock, 1998; Bordo et al. 2001; Issing, 2003) who believe that monetary stability eliminates 
financial instability sources. 
With the recent revolutionary financial changes following the global financial crisis (2007-2008), it seems that inflation 
targeting remains limited and unable to resist crises. Furthermore, despite the robustness of some economic 
fundamentals, these latter cannot resist exogenous chocks, leading thereafter to financial vulnerability. Pierre and Luiz 
(2013). In this respect, central banks had to revise their role in stabilizing prices so that they become tantamount to 
promoting financial stability. Following these changes, several economists like (White, 2006; Issing, 2009; Blanchard et 
al. 2010; Fouejieu, 2013) contested and challenged the Schwartz hypothesis (1995). These authors pointed to the 
negative effect of monetary stability on financial stability. Such as assumption may be explained by the fact that an 
expansionist monetary policy, based on a low interest rate, pushes banks to take additional risks by means of over credit 
granting like in the pre-crisis period of 2008. Such a move generated a default risk leading to a banking panic. 
Consequently, these researchers( Borio and Zhu, 2008; Tabak et al. 2013), suggest to improve inflation targeting by 
integrating financial stability as an objective to reach support this point of view assuming that low interest rates in the 
short term generate an increase in investors’ speculations, thus leading to an increase in asset price bubbles and 
consequently threatening financial stability. 
3. Literature Review 
The recent literature on inflation targeting has expanded to incorporate the financial stability dimension within the 
framework of this new monetary policy regime. However, from a Schwartz hypothesis (1995) perspective, these studies 
remain controversial without necessary reaching an ultimate consensus about whether to confirm or reject the positive 
correlation between price stability and financial stability. In this respect, (Bordo et al. 2001; Bordo  and Landon-Lane 
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2010; Issing, 2003) studied the impact of aggregate price chocks on the financial stability index in the US from 1870 to 
1997, by estimating a dynamic probit model and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to estimate individual 
series in terms of an instability index. The results indicate that a non-anticipated price movement generates an instability 
in the US economy, confirming thus the Schwartz hypothesis. These results are consistent with those of Woodford 
(2012), which indicate that monetary stability eliminates financial stability sources like salary price spirals. 
This field of study has expanded by recent studies like those of (Fazio et al. 2014, 2015) who studied the impact of 
inflation targeting on banking system stability, measured by a Z-score calculated for a sample of 5500 commercial 
banks operating in 70 countries (22 targeters and 48 non-targeters) observed from 1998 to 2012. The authors proved that 
inflation targeters dispose of a more stable banking system than non-targeting ones. More specifically, risk taking for 
commercial banks belonging to targeters and having a strong communication and better responsibility is lower than for 
those belonging to non-targeters. 
These different studies explain why central banks pursue price stability given that this latter is consistent with the 
financial system stability hypothesis. Furthermore, these above-mentioned studies that supported the Schwartz 
hypothesis have been challenged by (Borio et al .2003; Rajan, 2005; White, 2006; Leijonhufvud, 2007), who indicated 
that the premise that price stability is beneficial for financial stability should be revised. Because stable low inflation 
makes the financial system more vulnerable, this can be explained by the fact that a stable inflation reflects an 
optimistic perception of future economic development. Whereas this false perception may increase excessively stock 
values threatening then the financial market.   
Taylor (2009) who found that low interest rates reduce the occurrence probability of real estate prices bubbles has 
confirmed these assumptions. In other words, according to these results, a central bank that maintained its credibility via 
a low inflation rate jeopardizes the financial system. Consequently, financial instability is revealed in the emergence of 
financial crises. As for Frappa and Mesonnier (2010), they studied the relationship between inflation targeting and the 
formation of real estate price bubbles in a sample of 17 industrialized countries, among them we find 9 inflation 
targeters and 8 non-targeters observed from 1980 to 2007. The methodology used in this study was Average Treatment 
Effect approach in order to prove that an inflation targeting regime acts positively on the formation of real estate 
bubbles and thus it reflects a risk for financial stability. In this same context, and in order to explore the relationship 
between monetary policy and financial stability, Munoz and Schmidt-Hebbel (2012) examined monetary policy 
decisions for 28 emerging and developed countries from 1994 to 2011. In addition to including exchange rates, the 
authors integrated financial stability variables into the Taylor rule. These variables are private credit development and 
stock price. The results support the « leaning against the wind » hypothesis reflecting central banks’ concern with 
financial stability. These results are consistent with those of Fouejieu (2017) who studied a sample of 26 emerging 
market economies including 13 ITers, and13 non-ITers. The analysis used quarterly data over the period 
2000Q1-2010Q4, to combine information from a number of financial and macroeconomic indicators to construct a 
composite index measuring the financial stability. The main findings reveal that on average, ITers are financially more 
vulnerable than non ITers. The analysis of reaction functions suggest that contrary to their counterparts, 8 of the 13 
ITers central banks respond to financial imbalances with tighter policy. This study follows replicates the reasoning of 
(Cecchetti et al. 2000; Bordo and Olivier, 2002) who studied a sample of Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries from 1970 to 2001. By estimating the Taylor rule, the authors concluded to a 
disagreement about whether inflation targeting ensures by itself financial stability or it does so jointly with output 
stability. This has been confirmed by (Roubini, 2006), who found controversial results about the relationship between 
monetary stability and asset bubbles stability.  
The debate on the impact of inflation targeting on financial stability remains controversial because sometimes prices 
stability improves financial stability and sometimes it threatens it with a serious destabilization. For this reason, our 
study tries to enrich the limited relevant literature in order to cut through this line of controversial debate.  
4. Methodology  
4.1 Data and Descriptive Analyses  
In this section, we try to estimate the treatment effect of inflation targeting on a banking system stability. For this 
purpose, our study examines a sample of 763 commercial banks operating in 41 emerging countries observed between 
2000 and 2017. More specifically, our sample is as follows: 20 ITers emerging countries (treatment group) and 21 
non-ITers countries (control group). Our reasons to select the treatment group follow those of Lin and Ye (2009). 
Furthermore, our control group has been selected in response to the criterion defined by Lin and Ye (2009) of country 
size and economic growth. Table 1 below presents the different countries and their sampling dates. Moreover, like 
(Levya, 2008; Lucotte, 2012), we retain two adoption periods of inflation targeting. These are partial adoption (IT_PA), 
and full-fledged adoption (IT_FF). 
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Indeed, as detailed in appendix A, variables used to assess the relationship between inflation targeting and banking 
system stability are as follows: 
The dependent variable is banking stability measured by a Z-score, which measures stability of each bank i in country j 
in year t. This variable is written as follows: 
Z-score = ROA+EQTA /σ(ROA) 
With: 
ROA: Return on average assets represents the average performance of the bank's assets. 
EQTA: Equity to total assets as a measure of bank capitalization. 
σ(ROA): The standard deviation of ROA as a proxy for returns volatility. 
The independent variable:  Inflation targeting is measured by the annual growth in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
The data are taken from different sources: The World Bank's World Development Indicator, The International Monetary 
Fund's International Financial Statistics, and the Van Dijk Bankscope. 
 
Table 1. List of the sample countries with dates of inflation targeting adoption 
IT countries Non-IT countries 
 
 
Brazil 
Partial adoption 
 
1999 
Fully -Fledged Adoption 
 
1999 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Chile 1991 2000 Bulgaria 
Colombia 2000 2000 Cote d’Ivoire 
Czech Republic 1998 1998 Dominican Republic 
Ghana 2007 2007 Ecuador 
Guatemala 2005 2005 Egypt 
Hungary  2001 2001 El Salvador 
Indonesia 2005 2005 India 
Israel 1992 1997 Malaysia 
Mexico 1995 2001 Morocco 
Peru 1994 2002 Niger 
Philippines 2002 2002 Nigeria 
Poland 1999 1999 Pakistan 
Roumania 2005 2005 Russia 
Serbia 2006 2006 Senegal 
Slovakia 2005 2005 Singapore 
South Africa  2000 2000 Tunisia 
South Korea  1998 1998 Uruguay 
Thailand 2000 2000 Venezuela 
Turkey    2006 2006  
Source : Lucotte ( (2012) 
 
Fig.1 compares the average Z-score for ITers and non-ITers during the different sampling periods. Specifically, first, we 
try to compare the average Z-score for ITers and non-ITers over the period 2000-2017. Then, like Ball and Sheridan 
(2003), we compare banking stability indicator for ITers and non-Iters in the post-inflation targeting adoption period for 
both partial and fully fledged adoption. Fig. 1 shows that ITers dispose of a more stable banking system than non-ITers 
during the post-targeting period, but only for fully fledged adoption (Post-FF), as the Z-score for ITers is higher than 
that of non-ITers, which proves that ITers’ banking system is close to stability. 
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Figure 1. Average Z-score: IT vs. non-IT countries 
 
Fig. 2 compares the average Z-score for ITers during the pre- and post-adoption periods. It should be noted that on 
average these countries managed to stabilize their banking system during the post-adoption period, but only for fully 
fledged adoption (Post IT-FF). According to these descriptive statistics, the implementation of an inflation targeting 
regime is beneficial for emerging ITers countries as their banking system instability is reduced. Nevertheless, we cannot 
validate this relationship by limiting ourselves uniquely to this descriptive analysis. The relationship between inflation 
targeting and banking stability of emerging countries will be examined further with an econometric analysis. See 
appendix B. For more details. 
 
Figure 2. Average Z-score: pre-IT vs. post-IT periods 
 
4.2. Treatment Effect and Selection Bias 
In this section, our aim is to test the extent to which inflation targeting adoption affects banking system stability in 
emerging countries. More specifically, we test whether ITers’ banking systems are more stable than those of non-ITers. 
To this end, a new econometric methodology has been developed in macroeconomics. This is the propensity score 
matching method initially proposed by Rubin (1977), and developed more recently by Heckman et al. (1998). 
Indeed, in this study, our focus is determining how banking stability as measured by a Z-score would have evolved in 
emerging ITers, if the latter did not opt for inflation targeting. Note that this evolution is by definition unobservable. 
Similarly, and taking the opposite case, what would have non-ITers banking stability been if the latter had decided to 
adopt this monetary policy. In order to evaluate this causal effect, it is necessary to examine banking stability indicators 
by comparing ITers’ and non-ITers’ Z-scores, and determining whether, on average, ITers would have disposed of a 
more stable banking system, statistically different from that of non-ITers. 
However, in order to assess the treatment effect of inflation targeting for ITers, it is useful to estimate the average 
treatment effect (ATT) on the treated, written as follows: 
0
5
10
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25
Overall period Post IT-PA Post IT-FF
IT-countries
Non-IT countries
0
5
10
15
20
25
IT_PA IT_FF
Pre-IT period
Post-IT period
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                               ATT= E [ Yi1 |Di= 1] - E [ Yi0 |Di= 1]                              (1) 
With:  
D: a binary variable that takes 1 in case of inflation targeting adoption, and 0 otherwise.  
Yi1|Di=1: The outcome value when banking system stability as measured by a Z-score would have been observed if the 
country had adopted an inflation targeting policy.  
Yi0|Di=1: The outcome value when banking system stability would have been observed if the country had not opted for 
inflation targeting.  
The difficulty encountered while estimating the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is non-observing the term 
Yi0|Di=1. More specifically, we cannot observe a variation in financial stability of a targeting country that has not 
adopted such a policy. If the choice of targeting countries is random, ATT would be obtained by comparing the average 
treatment effect of the target group (treatment group) with that of the non-target group (control group). 
4.3 Propensity Score Matching Method and Conditioning Variables 
4.3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
In the recent literature on inflation targeting, some authors like (Lin and Ye 2007, 2009; De Mendonça and De 
Guimarães. 2012;  Lucotte 2012) have used non-parametric propensity score matching methods. This relatively 
intuitive methodology consists first in matching each ITer with a non-ITer "twin" country, with similar economic and 
institutional characteristics. Then, we proceed to considering the latter's outcome value as an outcome counterfactual to 
the ITer country, so that this matching method would have the advantage of reducing selectivity bias. 
The main idea behind matching is to use a control group to replicate a randomized experiment. Moreover, this method 
is grounded on two basic hypotheses. The first is the conditional independence hypothesis (Y0,  Y1┴D|X). Indeed, this 
hypothesis assumes that, with conditional variables X, the output value reflected by the banking stability indicator 
(Z-score) should be independent of the dummy variable (inflation targeting adoption). Under this assumption, equation 
1 is rewritten as follows.    
      ATT =E[Yi1| Di=1 , Xi] – E[Yi0|Di=0, Xi]                              (2) 
We have replaced E[Yi0|Di = 1] with the following observable: E[Yi0|Di=0,Xi]. In other words, the matching method 
consists in matching the treated units with those of the control group by similar x values. 
This method becomes difficult to apply, since the number of the covariates of X increases. To mend for this, Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) propose to match the treated units with those of the control group, referring to their propensity scores. 
Indeed, these propensity scores represent the probability of inflation targeting adoption, conditioned by X variables. 
Moreover, propensity scores are estimated via simple Logit or Probit models. 
In addition, the propensity score matching method rests on a second hypothesis, "the common support condition" (p 
(Xi)<1). This assumption assumes the existence of some comparable control units for each treated unit. Defining the 
common support area is based on the "Min-Max" method developed by Dehejia and Wahba (1999), and is commonly 
used in the literature. 
4.3.2 Conditioning Variables 
In order to estimate propensity scores, we refer to the conditioning variables that affect both the outcome value and the 
treatment variable. Indeed, these variables reflect institutional preconditions, in particular the lagged inflation rate for 
one period (INF_1) and the independence of the central bank within 5 years (TOR_5). For these variables, a negative 
relationship with inflation targeting is expected. As for the variables of degree of de facto flexibility of exchange rate 
(EXCH) and private sector credit level (CRED), a positive relationship with inflation targeting is expected. The second 
group of conditioning variables is presented by broad money growth (BMG), trade openness rate (OPEN), and GDP 
growth per capita (GDPpc_G), which are expected to have a negative impact on inflation targeting adoption. The 
expected sign of democracy indicator presented by (POLITY2) is positive, which implies a positive effect on inflation 
targeting adoption. 
5. Results 
5.1 Estimation of Propensity Scores 
In what follows, we report on propensity scores matching, in terms of the average treatment effect on the treated, 
estimated as: 
ATT =E[Yi1|Di=1 , p(Xi)] – E[Yi0|Di=0, p(Xi)]                          (3) 
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To estimate propensity scores, the Probit model was used. In this case, the dependent variable is inflation targeting 
adoption whose scores are reported in Table 2 below. Two sampling periods are distinguished; partial adoption and 
fully fledged adoption. 
These results indicate that all the coefficients of the conditioning variables are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% 
levels for both partial adoption and Fully Fledged adoption, with the exception of the coefficients of the variables 
OPEN and BMG. The latter is statistically insignificant for both partial and fully fledged adoption, while the OPEN 
variable is statistically insignificant for fully fledged adoption. 
Moreover, most of the coefficients of the conditioning variables have signs as expected by the literature. Nevertheless, 
exceptions are the signs of the coefficients of the TOR and CRED variables for partial adoption. The same is true for 
the coefficients of CRED and OPEN for fully fledged adoption. Indeed, this finding corroborates that in the literature, 
suggesting that any country with exchange rate flexibility, better democracy, high inflation lags and low 
macroeconomic performance is likely to adopt inflation targeting in its partial and fully fledged versions. (Lin and Ye 
2007, 2009; Lucotte , 2012). 
As for the other conditioning variables, dependence of inflation targeting adoption to these variables varies across 
sampling periods. Specifically, the central bank’s degree of independence (TOR_5) and domestic credit to the private 
sector (CRED) directly relate to the likelihood of inflation targeting adoption, yet in opposite terms to those proved by 
the literature for both partial and fully fledged adoption. 
 
Table 2. Probit estimates propensity scores 
Variables IT_PA IT_FF 
GDPpc_G -0.083*** -0.067*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
INF_1 -0.048***   -0.034***   
 (0.007) (0.005) 
BMG 0.008 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
CRED -0.010*** -0.007** 
 0.003 (0.003) 
OPEN 0.001 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
EXCH 0.380*** 0.278*** 
 (0.029) (0.022) 
TOR_5 11.273*** -7.664*** 
 (0.905) (0.595) 
POLITY2 1.007*** 0.699*** 
 (0.092) (0.068) 
Number of observations 1191 1191 
Pseudo-R2 0.5703  
Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
***, **, represent respectively the statistical significance at threshold of 1%, 5%. 
 
5.2 Matching Results 
Before proceeding to estimating matching, we should first establish the common support region. To this end, we used 
the Dehejia and Wahba’s (1999) method, which consists in eliminating observations of the control group whose 
propensity scores are above the maximum or below the minimum. This ensures those observations of the treated and 
those of the untreated share the same support. 
The ATT on the Treated estimate of banking stability is reported in Table 3. The first three columns represent the 
results by the nearest-neighbor matching estimator. The fourth column represents the results of the Local linear 
regression-matching estimator. The last column represents the results of the Kernel matching estimator. 
In this table, all ATTs estimated by the three estimators are statistically insignificant for both partial and fully fledged 
adoption. This proves that inflation targeting does not affect banking stability. More specifically, the evolution of the 
Z-score reflecting the degree of banking insolvency can not be explained by inflation targeting adoption. This indicates 
that the effect of inflation targeting on banking stability is virtually absent, because of banking and financial market in 
emerging economies are less developed at the time of adoption. On the other hand, this motivates the introduction of 
some reforms, which should necessarily be undertaken and implemented during the pre-adoption period and that their 
late or even post-adoption implementation will not have the expected effect on macroeconomic performance. In other 
words, a well-developed and healthy banking and financial sector represents not only a prerequisite for the 
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implementation of inflation targeting, but also a better implementation context of monetary policy, allowing thus for an 
inflation targeting policy efficient in terms of financial and economic stability. 
 
Table 3. Matching estimates of treatment effect on the Banking Stability 
Algorithms of matching 
 Nearest-neighbor matching LLRM Kernel matching 
 N=1 N=2 N=3 (Tricube) (Tricube) 
Partial Adoption 
ATT 6,039 
(10,418) 
4,934 
(8,11) 
6,335 
(6,512) 
6.592 
(90.987) 
5.988 
(3.962) 
Nb. of treated units on 
common support 
241 241 241 241 241 
Nb. of treated units off 
common support 
160 160 160 160 160 
Nb. of untreated 
observations  
790 790 790 790 790 
Fully-fledged adoption 
ATT 
-9.5 
(9.566) 
-0.544 
(7.606) 
1.932 
(6.182) 
6.41 
(71.795) 
4.358 
(3.9) 
Nb. of treated units on 
Common support 
367 367 367 367 367 
Nb. of treated units off 
common support 
26 26 26 26 26 
Nb. of untreated 
observations  
798 798 798 798 798 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors based on 2000 replications are in parentheses. 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper essentially reports on a study dealing with the relationship between inflation targeting policy and financial 
stability. In this study, we examined a sample of emerging countries in an attempt to assess whether the banking system 
of  ITers is more fragile than that of non-ITers. Referring to the literature on inflation targeting, we opted for the 
treatment effect method by applying the propensity score matching method. 
Our results pointed to a statistically insignificant relationship between inflation targeting adoption and banking stability. 
Specifically, maintaining inflation at low levels does not affect banking stability of emerging countries. 
In other words, it is concluded that because the banking and financial systems of emerging countries are less developed, 
any effect of inflation targeting on banking stability is undermined, and that its late or even post-adoption 
implementation will not have the desired effect on macroeconomic performance. 
The policy implications of this study relate to emerging countries considering some reforms and preconditions before 
adopting inflation targeting. Such reforms serve these countries not only as a ground to set up an institutional 
framework conducive to an efficient inflation targeting, but also as prerequisites to benefit from the expected effects of 
this regime on both economic performance and financial stability. 
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Notes 
Note 1. The two selection criteria of the control group assume that any country with a Gross Domestic Product/capita at 
least as high as the poorest targeting country and with a population at least as important as the least populated targeting 
country, should be excluded from the control group. 
Note 2. Partial adoption is known by incomplete preconditions necessary to inflation targeting adoption as well as a lack 
of implementation of this regime’s operational framework like publication of annual reports on expected inflation rates 
(Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). 
Note 3. Fully fledged adoption denotes undertaking some prerequisites necessary to the implementation of inflation 
targeting. 
Note 4. Note that Slovakia abandoned the IT in 2009 and joined the euro area. 
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Appendix A. Variables’ definitions and sources 
Variables Definition Sources 
IT 
 
Binary variable taking the value 1 if the country 
adopt the inflation-targeting regime at the 
period t, and 0 otherwise. 
Levya (2008). 
 
Z-Score 
 
Indicator of banking stability.  The index that 
measures degree of stability of banks. 
Author calculations based on Van Dijk  Bank Scope database 
2018. 
GDPpc_G   
 
Real GDP per capita growth.  
 
World Development Indicators (WDI) are now 
available free on the World Bank’s website at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
INF_1 
One-year lagged inflation rate (as annual 
change of the CPI).  
 
World Development Indicators (WDI) are now 
available free on the World Bank’s website at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
TOR_5 
 
Turnover rate of central bank governors based 
on 5-year averages (de facto central bank 
independence indicator). 
 
Author’s calculations based on central bank websites and 
Dreher et al. (2008; April 2009 update). Dreher’s database is 
available at: 
http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/datasets/89555.html 
CRED 
Domestic credit to private sector ratio in % of 
GDP. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) are now 
available free on the World Bank’s website at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
BMG Broad money growth. 
World Development Indicators (WDI) are now 
available free on the World Bank’s website at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
EXCH 
 
De facto flexibility indicator of exchange rate, 
comprised between 1 and 14 from the least to 
more flexible exchange rate regime. 
IMF's AREAR;Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
 
OPEN  
 
Trade openness (as the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services as a share of 
GDP). 
World Development Indicators (WDI) are now 
available free on the World Bank’s website at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
POLITY2 
 
Indicator of democracy taking values from −10 
(very autocratic) to +10 
(very democratic).                           
Polity IV Project 
 
 
Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Inflation targeting countries (2000-2017)     
IT_PA 6346 .8159471 .387579 0 1 
IT_FF 6346 .8413174 .3654087 0 1 
Zscore 4338 21.05445 122.3001 -878.7543 3823.777 
GDPpc_G 6346 3.013804 3.390501 -11.87729 11.25178 
INF_1 6170 8.753257 11.4668 -1.166896 95.00523 
BMG 6314 16.03091 16.24644 -21.86383 160.8075 
CRED 6329 41.1373 32.42744 7.089964 160.1249 
OPEN 6346 66.7854 32.76909 22.10598 183.4276 
EXCH 1.729 11.20879 2.81403 2 14 
TOR_5 4076 .1621197 .120847 0 .6 
POLITY2 6208 8.230831 1.575152 -5 10 
Non inflation targeting countries  (2000-2017)     
IT_PA 5745 .9333333 .2494655 0 1 
IT_FF 5745 .8666667 .3399642 0 1 
Zscore 3846 18.45226 87.79258 -801.3274 3172.583 
GDPpc_G 5221 3.16843 41.9185 -1050247 30.34224 
INF_1 5745 17.20119 41.9185 -2.302125 324.9969 
BMG 5506 21.7566 22.0519 -3.048625 160.8075 
CRED 5598 38.22218 29.28844 3.540243 134.9998 
OPEN 5703 76.47439 65.62888 21.85242 439.6567 
EXCH 1670 6.921557 4.076759 1 15 
TOR_5 3660 .1920219 .188554 0 .8 
POLITY2 5697 4.917149 4.576421 -6 10 
Source: Author calculations 
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